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Abstract
The issue of empowering patients to be well informed with regards to their health records has
been well accepted in the community, which is known as the Personal Health Record (PHR). PHR
has been believed as the solution for better management of an individual’s health, and as the tool
that will empower the patient in correlation with healthcare providers through the ability to provide
his/her own medical history. In this work, we aim to take one step further by equipping patients with
the ability to “control” the access to their PHR efficiently and easily, by incorporating the emerg-
ing cloud technology. Specifically, we aim to provide the patients with the luxury of using the
power of the cloud to conduct the outsourced work efficiently. To realize this, we present the notion
of online/offline ciphertext-policy attribute-based proxy re-encryption scheme, which is very useful
primitive in empowering personal health records in cloud computing. We present such a notion as
well as a set of security requirements. More specifically, we define two security models covering
both outsider and insider attacks. Furthermore, we present a concrete construction of such a scheme,
and prove that it is secure under the well known complexity assumptions and following our security
models.
Keywords Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption, Proxy Re-Encryption, Online/Offline encryp-
tion, CCA security.
1 Introduction
The focus of healthcare has been shifted from healthcare providers’ paternalistic approach to the con-
sumer oriented approach. It is noted that consumers that are well informed about their illnesses tend to
understand and to follow instructions and to ask more insightful questions. The PHR (Personal Health
Record) could be seen as the solution for better management of an individual’s health, and as the tool that
will empower the patient in correlation with healthcare providers through the ability to provide his/her
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own medical history. Patient access to their own record is important as respecting clinicians should re-
spect patient’s autonomy and disclose to their patients relevant information regarding their diagnosis,
prognosis or the implications of diagnostic tests. In this work, we are motivated to empower PHR with
the emerging cloud computing solution. Especially, we would like to equip patients with the ability to
“control” the access to their PHR efficiently and easily, while the patients are away from their desktop
computing solution.
To motivate this work, let us consider the following scenario. The blood test at the medical institute
has just collected a patient’s, Alice’s, blood test sample at the medical institute. As the result of the blood
test is now available, the medical institute will then encrypt it and send it to their hospital’s private cloud.
We note that the cloud will not be able to decrypt this ciphertext without Alice’s private key, which is
inaccessible by the cloud. Technically, we can view this ciphertext as an intermediate ciphertext. Alice
is aware that her blood result test is available in the cloud. Now, Alice can decide which physician at the
hospital that she would like to discuss this result with, and therefore, she will need to enable the access
control to that particular physician. As an example, she can further restrict the time of the access as well,
i.e. during the appointment time. What Alice needs to do is merely to create a re-encryption key using
her own private key, and provides it to the cloud. Note that this re-encryption key will not enable the
cloud to decrypt the message, but rather it will just enable the cloud to “re-encrypt” the ciphertext and
it will be decryptable by the appointed physician. As an example, the policy that Alice constructs can
be something like {Dr. Brown ∧ Monday 15/09/2014 at 1:00pm to 2:00pm}, where 1:00pm to 2:00pm
indicates the time of her appointment with Dr. Brown. Subsequently, the cloud can re-encrypt the
intermediate ciphertext under Alice’s policy and keeps it securely in the cloud. Only Dr. Brown will be







Figure 1: The medical institute generates the intermediate cipertext IntC and sends it to the cloud. The
patient Alice generates the re-encryption key RK based on her policy and sends it to the cloud. The cloud
generates the final ciphertext CT using IntC and RK and sends it to Dr. Brown.
In order to realize the solution for this problem, we propose the notion of online/offline ciphertext
attribute-based proxy encryption (OO-CP-AB-PRE). This is a new cryptographic notion, which may be
also of interest for other applications.
One may notice that the recent notion of Online/Offline Attribute-based Encryption (OO-ABE) [15]
is closely related to this scenario, and it might be a candidate as a solution to this problem. Unfortunately,
the notion of OO-ABE is insufficient to solve the above scenario. If we employ an OO-ABE in the above
scenario, then the notion of cloud is redundant, as Alice would need to re-encrypt the ciphertext (i.e.
the intermediate ciphertext in the above context) to provide the access to Dr. Brown. We argue that this
is a cumbersome process as this process may not be feasible to be conducted by Alice, who may just
be equipped with a smartphone to do so. Re-encrypting the whole intermediate ciphertext might be too
costly to be done in a mobile device, and therefore we need to “outsource” this activity to the cloud.
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Furthermore, in practice, if OO-ABE is used in this scenario, we will still require the involvement of the
cloud as the private cloud of the hospital that will store all the results of the blood tests (and any other
medical tests conducted at the medical institute). Hence, the cloud will only be used as a storage and
therefore, after the medical institute provides the result of the blood test, it will then need to store the
encrypted result in the cloud. When Alice requires to re-encrypt this ciphertext to enable Dr. Brown
to read it, then she will need to download the whole ciphertext entirely prior to conducting the required
re-encryption. Due to these reasons, OO-ABE is insufficient to solve the above problem.
1.1 Our Contributions
We intend to propose the notion of Online/Offline Ciphertext Attribute-based Proxy Re-Encryption (OO-
CP-AB-PRE) to directly solve the above scenario. We offer the definitions and security models for such
a cryptographic primitive. In particular, we offer a selective access structure and chosen ciphertext secu-
rity game for the OO-CP-AB-PRE system that covers the outsider attacks. We also show that this system
is selectively collusion resistant that covers the insider attacks. Based on the new techniques for On-
line/Offline Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) systems from [15] and the methods for Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption (CP-AB-PRE) systems used in [20], we provide the first contruc-
tion of CCA secure single-hop unidirectional CP-AB-PRE supporting any monotonic access policy and
dealing with Online/Offline encryption. In this setting, the ciphertext is associated with an access policy
represented as a Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) matrix and the private key is attached to a set of
attributes. Our scheme is proven secure in the random oracle model under the “q−1” assumption [28].
1.2 Related Work
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). Sahai and Waters [29] introduced the notion of Attribute-Based
Encryption (ABE). Goyal et al. [13] implemented the first Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) such that the ci-
phertexts are associated to an attribute set and each of the private keys is related to an access policy over
the attributes. The concept of an ABE setting with multiple central authorities was addressed in [9, 10].
Constructions that do not consider the issue of collusion resistance can be found in [31, 24, 7]. Lewko
and Waters [19] gave the first large universe KP-ABE scheme in composite order groups and in the stan-
dard model. Based on the techniques initiated by Okamoto and Takashima [26], Lewko [17] suggested
the first large universe KP-ABE scheme in prime order groups. Recently, Rouselakis and Waters [28]
proposed two large universe ABE constructions proven selectively secure in the standard model under
two “q-type” assumptions.
Ciphertext-Policy ABE. Bethencourt et al. [4] proposed the first Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE)
such that the ciphertexts are related with an access policy and each of the private keys corresponds to
a set of attributes. Afterwards, Cheung and Newport [11] suggested a CP-ABE scheme proven secure
and supporting only AND gates over attributes. At the same time, Ostrovsky et al. [27] proposed an
ABE system with non-montonic access structures: they achieved to relaize negative attributes. Waters
[32] proposed the first fully secure CP-ABE construction. Lewko et al. [18] used dual system encryp-
tion techniques to obtain a fully secure CP-ABE system but less efficient than the one from [32]. More
recently, Attrapadung et al. [2] offered a CP-ABE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts.
Online/Offline CP-ABE. Even et al. [12] introduced the notion of online/offline cryptography applied
for signatures. Later, Shamir and Tauman [30] generalized the method based on chameleon hash func-
tions. Guo et al. [14] applied the concept for Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) and obtained an offline
encryption system for IBE. Recently, Hohenberger and Waters [15] developped new techniques for On-
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line/Offline ABE encryption and key generation and gave two concret schemes, one for key policy and
the other for ciphertext policy.
Proxy Re-Encryption. Mambo and Okamoto [23] introduced the concept of decryption rights delega-
tion. Following the idea, Blaze and al. Blaze et al. [5] gave the formalization of Proxy Re-Encryption
(PRE) and gave a seminal bidirection PRE scheme. Later, Ivan and Dodis [16] suggested concrete def-
initions of bidirectional and unidirectional proxy functions. Ateniese et al. [1] constructed three unidi-
rectional CPA-secure PRE schemes. More recently, Canetti and Hohenberger [8] achieved CCA security
for PRE systems.
CP-ABE-PRE. Liang et al. [21] first presented a CP-AB-PRE setting and gave a scheme based on
the CP-ABE construction proposed in [11] such that AND gates on positive and negative attributes are
supported. Mizuno and Doi [25] offered a hybrid PRE construction such that it can bridge ABE and IBE:
ciphertexts generated in the ABE setting can be converted to ciphertexts which can be decrypted in the
context of IBE. Later, Luo et al. [22] gave a CP-AB-PRE scheme such that AND gates on multivalued
and negative attributes are supported. All the aforementionned papers proposed CPA secure CP-AB-PRE
systems. Liang et al. [20] proposed the first CP-AB-PRE construction CCA secure and supporting any
monotonic access policy.
1.3 Paper Organization
In the next section, we give the some definitions of tools employed in cryptography. In Sec. 3, we present
the formal definition of our Online/Offline Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption (OO-
CP-AB-PRE) system, along with its security models definition. In Sec. 4, we build a concrete OO-CP-
AB-PRE scheme using pairings. In Sec. 5, we give the security proofs related to our construction, along
with the definitions of the used hardness assumptions. In Sec. 6, we discuss about the computation costs
in our scheme and compare them to other schemes. Finally, we conclude our paper in the last section.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Access Structure [3]
Definition 1. Let {P1, · · · ,Pn} be a set of parties. A collection AS⊆ 2{P1,··· ,Pn} is monotone if the follow-
ing implication is satisfied: if ∀B,C such that B ∈ AS and B ⊆C, then C ∈ AS. An (monotone) access
structure is a (monotone) collection AS ⊆ 2{P1,··· ,Pn} \ { /0}. We define the sets in AS as the authorized
sets (we say also that these sets satisfy AS) and the sets not in AS as the unauthorized sets (we say also
that these sets do not satisfy AS).
In our context, the role of the parties is taken by the attributes. Thus, the access structure AS will
contain the authorized attribute sets.
2.2 Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme (LSSS) [3]
Definition 2. Let Π be a secret-sharing scheme over a set of parties P. Π is said linear over Zp if:
1. The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2. There is a l×n matrix M (the share-generating matrix for Π). For all i = 1, · · · , l, the i-th row of
M, written as Mi, is labeled by a party ρ(i), where ρ : {1, · · · , l} → P. Let~y = (s,y2, · · · ,yn) be a
4
Empowering Personal Health Records with Cloud Computing Gritti, Susilo, Plantard, Liang, and Wong
column vector, where s ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared, and y2, · · · ,yn ∈ Zp be randomly chosen.
Thus, M~y is the vector of l shares of the secret s according to Π. The share (M~y)i belongs to party
ρ(i).
A linear secret-sharing scheme satisfies the following linear reconstruction property. Let Π be a
LSSS for the access structure AS, S ∈AS be any authorized set (S satisfies AS), and I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S} ⊂
{1, · · · , l}. Therefore, there exist constants {wi ∈ Zp}i∈I satisfying the following implication: if {λi} are
valid shares of any secret s according to Π, then ∑i∈I wiλi = s.
Convention
The vector (1,0, · · · ,0) is the target vector for any LSSS. Let I be a set of rows of M. If I is an authorized
set, then (1,0, · · · ,0) is in the span of I. If I is an unanthorized set, then (1,0, · · · ,0) is not in the span of
I. There is a vector w such that w · (1,0, · · · ,0) =−1 and ∀i ∈ I,w ·Mi = 0.
2.3 Bilinear Map
Definition 3. Let G and GT be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p∈Θ(2λ ) (where λ is the
security parameter). Let g be a generator of G and e : G×G→GT be a bilinear map with the following
properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀u,v ∈G,∀a,b ∈ Zp,e(ua,vb) = e(u,v)ab,
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g,g) 6= 1GT .
G is said to be a bilinear group if the group operation in G and the bilinear map e are both efficiently
computable. We can easily see that e is symmetric since e(ga,gb) = e(g,g)ab = e(gb,ga).
3 Definitions
3.1 Online/Offline Ciphertext Attribute-based Proxy Re-Encryption (OO-CP-AB-PRE)
Model
The Online/Offline model enables as much precomputation of ciphertext as possible such that the
required access policy is unknown.
Definition 4. Let S be a set of attributes and AS be an access structure. An Online/Offline Ciphertext-
Policy Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption (OO-CP-AB-PRE) scheme for access structure space A S S ,
consists of the following six algorithms:
1. Setup(λ ,U )→ (PK,MSK): on input a security parameter λ ∈ N and an attribute universe U ,
output the public parameters PK and a master secret key MSK.
2. KeyGen(PK,MSK,S)→ SK: on input the public parameters PK, the master secret key MSK and
an attribute set S, output a private key SK associated with the set S. We assume that SK contains
a description of the attribute set S.
3. OffEnc(PK,M )→ IntC: on input the public parameters PK and a message M from the message
space MS , output an intermediate ciphertext IntC.
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4. ReKeyGen(PK,SK,AS)→ RK: on input the public parameters PK, a private key SK for the
attribute set S and the access structure AS, output a re-encryption key RK associated with the set
S.
5. OnEnc(PK,RK, IntC)→ CT : on input the public parameters PK, the re-encryption key RK for
the attribute set S and associated with the access structure AS the intermediate ciphertext IntC,
output a ciphertext CT .
6. Dec(PK,SK′,CT )→M : on input the public parameters PK, a private key SK′ for the attribute
set S′ and a ciphertext CT associated with the access structure AS, output a message M if S′
satisfies AS, or a symbol ⊥ indicating either CT is invalid or S′ does not satisfy AS.
The algorithms Setup and KeyGen are conducted by a trusted third party. The algorithm OffEnc
can be executed by any user or any third party. The algorithm ReKeyGen is run by a user who has
knowledge of the corresponding private key SK. The algorithm OnEnc can be run by the cloud. The
algorithm Dec is run by a user who has knowledge of the corresponding private key SK′. In this scenario,
we assume that the cloud is trusted and it will execute the required re-encryption algorithm correctly. We
do not want to over-complicate the scenario by dealing with an untrusted cloud, as this will make the
description of the scheme becomes very complicated. We note that dealing with a non-trusted cloud can
be handled using different mechanisms, which is outside the scope of this work.
Correctness
For an attribute universe U and a security parameter λ ∈ N, for all (PK,MSK)← Setup(λ ,U ), for all
S,S′⊆U , for all access structure AS∈A S S , for all message M ∈MS , if SK←KeyGen(PK,MSK,S),
RK ← ReKeyGen(PK,SK,AS), SK′← KeyGen(PK,MSK,S′) and S′ ∈ AS, then M ← Dec(PK,SK′,
OnEnc(PK,RK,OffEnc(PK,M )).
The algorithms in OO-CP-AB-PRE are depicted in Fig. 2.
In our scheme, we require that only a valid decryptor of the intermediate ciphertext IntC can generate
a valid re-encryption key. Moreover, an attacker can generate any re-encryption key it wishes given an
intermediate ciphertext IntC, but the final ciphertext will be invalid. This means that nobody can in fact
decrypt the ciphertext correctly and retrieve the plaintext. More precisely, consider the following attack.
The attacker is given IntC that depends only on the public key PK and the message M , such that it
has insufficient attribute set S′. It can generate the re-encryption key RK′ by running the ReKeyGen
algorithm with input its own private key SK′ and access structure (M,ρ) that it selects (meaning that
this access structure allows the attacker to decrypt the final ciphertexts). It then proceeds to the online
encryption of IntC using the previous re-encryption RK′ that it created. It obtains a final ciphertext CT .
Thus, the attacker can decrypt CT running the Decrypt algorithm with input its own private key SK′. We
call this type of attacks as a “trivial attack”. We exclude this trivial attack from our security model.
3.2 Security Models
In this section, we first describe the security against outsider attacks and then, we focus on the
security against insider attacks.
3.2.1 Outsider Attacks
From an outsider’s point of view, we consider outsider attacks, which deals with selective IND-CCA
security, as outlined below.
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Figure 2: A third party generates the private keys for users U1, U2 and U3. U1 generates the intermediate
ciphertext IntC and sends it to the cloud. U2 generates the re-encryption key RK and sends it to the cloud.
The cloud generates the final ciphertext CT and sends it to user U3. U3 successfully decrypts CT if the
attribute set S3 related to the private key SK3 satisfies AS.
Selective IND-CCA Security An OO-CP-ABE-PRE scheme scheme is selectively IND-CCA secure
if no probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A can win the game below with non-negligible ad-
vantage. In the game, B is the simulator, λ is the security parameter, and U is the attribute universe.
Init. A outputs a challenge access structure (M∗,ρ∗) to B.
Setup. B runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters PK to A .
Phase 1. A is given access to the following oracles:
1. Private key extraction oracle Osk(S): on input an attribute set S, B runs SK←KeyGen(PK,MSK,S)
and returns SK to A .
2. Re-encryption key extraction oracle Ork(S,(M,ρ)): on input an attribute set S and an access
structure (M,ρ), B runs RK← ReKeyGen(PK,SK,(M,ρ)) and returns RK to A , where SK←
KeyGen(PK,MSK,S).
3. Online encryption oracle Oone(S,(M,ρ), IntC): on input an attribute set S, an access structure
(M,ρ) and an intermediate ciphertext IntC, B runs CT ←OnEnc(PK,RK, IntC) and returns CT
to A , where RK← ReKeyGen(PK,SK,(M,ρ)) and SK←KeyGen(PK,MSK,S).
4. Ciphertext decryption oracle Od(S,CT ): on input an attribute set S and a ciphertext CT , B runs
M ← Dec(PK,SK,CT ) and returns M to A , where SK←KeyGen(PK,MSK,S) and S satisfies
(M,ρ).
We notice that if the ciphertexts queried to oracles Oone and Od are invalid, then B simply outputs ⊥. In
this phase, it is forbidden to issue the following queries:
• Osk(S) for any S satisfying (M∗,ρ∗),
7
Empowering Personal Health Records with Cloud Computing Gritti, Susilo, Plantard, Liang, and Wong
• Ork(S,(M,ρ)) for any S satisfying (M∗,ρ∗).
Challenge. A submits two equal length messages M0 and M1. B flips a random coin b ∈ {0,1}
and encrypts Mb online under (M∗,ρ∗). The ciphertext CT ∗ ← OnEnc(PK,RK, IntC) is given to A ,
such that RK← ReKeyGen(PK,SK,(M∗,ρ∗)) and IntC←OffEnc(PK,Mb).
Phase 2. Phase 1 is repeated except for the following:
1. Osk(S) for any S satisfying (M∗,ρ∗),
2. Ork(S,(M,ρ)) for any S satisfying (M∗,ρ∗),
3. Oone(S,(M,ρ), IntC) for any invalid intermediate ciphertext or invalid ciphertext where S satisfies
(M∗,ρ∗),
4. Od(S,CT ) for any invalid ciphertext or CT =CT ∗ where S satisfies (M∗,ρ∗).
Guess. A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0,1}. If b′ = b then A wins.
The advantage of A is defined as ε1 = AdvIND−CCAOO−CP−AB−PRE,A (λ ,U ) = |Pr[b′ = b]−1/2|.
Definition 5. An OO-CP-AB-PRE is selectively IND-CCA secure for attribute universe U if no prob-
abilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A can win the game above with non-negligible advantage,
meaning that ε1 ≤ 12 +negl(λ ), where negl is a negligible function.
We illustrate the selective CCA security model in Fig 3.
3.2.2 Insider Attacks
Selective Collusion Resistance From an insider’s point of view, we consider insider attacks, which
deals with selective collusion resistance, as outlined below. The collusion resistance is also known as the
master key security in the litterature [8, 20, 21, 22].
In the following security model, we omit the descriptions of the Online encryption and Ciphertext
decryption oracles since they are straightforward: any re-encryption key could be correctly generated
from the Re-encryption key extraction oracle.
An OO-CP-ABE-PRE scheme scheme is selectively collusion resistant if no probabilistic polynomial-
time (PPT) adversary A can win the game below with non-negligible advantage. In the game, B is the
simulator, λ is the security parameter, and U is the attribute universe.
Init. A outputs an attribute set S∗ to B.
Setup. B runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters PK to A .
Query Phase. A is given access to the following oracles:
1. Private key extraction oracle Osk(S): on input an attribute set S 6= S∗, B runs SK←KeyGen(PK,MSK,S)
and returns SK to A .
2. Re-encryption key extraction oracle Ork(S,(M,ρ)): on input an attribute set S and an acces struc-
ture (M,ρ), B runs RK ← ReKeyGen(PK,SK,(M,ρ)) and returns RK to A , where SK ←
KeyGen(PK,MSK,S).
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b ∈R {0, 1}
IntC ← OffEnc(PK,Mb)
RK ← ReKeyGen(PK, SK, (M∗, ρ∗))
CT ∗ ← OnEnc(PK,RK, IntC)CT
∗
Phase 2
Guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}
b′ = b⇒ A wins
Queries to Oracles:
SK
SK ← KeyGen(PK,MSK, S)
RK
RK ← ReKeyGen(PK, SK, (M,ρ))
CT







SK ← KeyGen(PK,MSK, S)
RK
RK ← ReKeyGen(PK, SK, (M,ρ))
CT
CT ← OnEnc(PK,RK, IntC)M M← Dec(PK, SK,CT )
Figure 3: Selective CCA security Game between the adversary A and the simulator B.
Output. A submits a private key SK∗ for the S∗.
The advantage of A is defined as ε2 = AdvCROO−CP−AB−PRE,A (λ ,U ) = Pr[A succeeds].
Definition 6. An OO-CP-AB-PRE is selectively collusion resistant for attribute universe U if no prob-
abilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A can win the game above with non-negligible advantage,
meaning that ε2 ≤ negl(λ ), where negl is a negligible function.
We illustrate the selective collusion resistance model in Fig 4.
4 Online/Offline Ciphertext Attribute-based Proxy Re-Encryption (OO-
CP-AB-PRE) Construction
Our scheme is based on the Online/Offline CP-ABE system developped by Hohenberger and Waters
[15] and the CP-AB-PRE system proposed by Liang et al. [20]. One can now create an intermediate
ciphertext in the offline phase and then can translate it to a ciphertext for a hitherto unknown access
structure, under a re-encryption key generated from the sender’s private key. The Hohenberger-Waters
scheme [15] is based on the unbounded CP-ABE construction implemented by Rouselakis and Waters
[28]. We assume the existence of a bound P on the maximum number of rows in an LSSS access struc-
ture that will be used to encrypt in the system below.
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Output SK∗ for S∗
SK ← KeyGen(PK,MSK, S)SK
RK ← ReKeyGen(PK, SK, (M,ρ))RK
Figure 4: Selective collusion resistance Game between the adversary A and the simulator B.
The idea is based on the Boneh-Boyen IBE system [6]. During the offline phase, a ciphertext is
generated by encrypting to an exponent x ∈ Zp chosen at random with another random element s ∈ Zp.
This ciphertext has elements C1 = gs and C2 = (uxh)s. Moreover, the public parameters are a description
of the bilinear group G of order p, along with the tupke (g,u,h,e(g,g)α), and the encapsulated key
is K = e(g,g)αs. The intermediate ciphertext IntC = (C1,C2,x,s) is stored by the offline algorithm.
During the online phase, given an identity id ∈ Zp, the encryptor adds a “correction factor” equal to
s · (id− x) ∈ Zp to the components C1 and C2.
4.1 Construction
Setup(λ ,U ). The Setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and the attribute universe
U viewed as Zp, and chooses two bilinear cyclic groups G and GT of prime order p ∈ Θ(2λ ), along
with a bilinear map e : G×G→ GT . It also chooses random generators g,h,u,v,w ∈ G and picks at
random an exponent α ∈ Zp. It defines five hash functions H1 : GT → {0,1}2λ , H2 : {0,1}2λ → Zp,
H3 : {0,1}λ → Zp, H4 : {0,1}∗ → G and H5 : {0,1}∗ → G. It then sets the public parameters PK =
(p,G,GT ,e,g,h,u,v,w,e(g,g)α ,H1,H2,H3,H4, H5) and the master secret key MSK = α .
KeyGen(PK,MSK,S). The KeyGen algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK, the master
secret key MSK, and an attribute set S= {A1,A2, · · · ,Ak}⊆Zp. It chooses random values r,r1,r2, · · · ,rk ∈
Zp. It then computes K0 = gαwr, K1 = gr and for i = 1, · · · ,k, Ki,2 = gri and Ki,3 = (uAih)riv−r. The pri-
vate key is SK = (S,K0,K1,{Ki,2,Ki,3}i∈[1,k]).
OffEnc(PK,M ). The OffEnc algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK and a message
M from the message space {0,1}λ . We assume there exists a maximum bound of P rows in any LSSS
access structure used in a ciphertext. It first picks at random β ∈ {0,1}λ and computes s = H2(β ,M ),
B1 = (M ‖β )⊕H1(e(g,g)αs), C0,1 = gs and C0,2 = hs. Then, for j = 1, · · · ,P, it chooses at random
λ ′j, t j,x j ∈ Zp and computes C j,1 = wλ
′
j vt j , C j,2 = (ux j h)−t j and C j,3 = gt j . This process can be seen as
encrypting for a random attribute x j with a random “share” λ ′j of s, and it will be corrected in the online
phase with the attributes defined in the ReKeyGen process. We notice that the work done in this offline
phase is almost equivalent to the one of the regular encryption algorithm in [28]. Moreover, it computes
D = H4(B1,C0,1,C0,2,(C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · ,(CP,1,CP,2,CP,3))s. Eventually, the intermediate ciphertext is
IntC = (s,B1,C0,1,C0,2,{λ ′j, t j,x j,C j,1,C2, j,C3, j} j∈[1,P],D).
ReKeyGen(PK,SK,(M,ρ)). The ReKeyGen algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK,
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the private key SK for attribute set S = {A1,A2, · · · ,Ak} ⊆Zp, and a LSSS access structure (M,ρ), where
M is a l×n matrix and l ≤ P.
First, it first picks at random β̃ ,δ ∈ {0,1}λ and computes s̃ = H2(β̃ ,δ ), B̃1 = (δ‖β̃ )⊕H1(e(g,g)α s̃),
and C̃0 = gs̃. It picks at random ỹ2, · · · , ỹn ∈Zp, sets the vector ~̃y = (s̃, ỹ2, · · · , ỹn)T , and computes a vector
of shares of s̃ as (λ̃1, · · · , λ̃l)T = M ·~̃y. Then, for j = 1, · · · , l, it chooses at random t̃ j ∈ Zp and computes
C̃ j,1 =wλ̃ j vt̃ j , C̃ j,2 =(uρ( j)h)−t̃ j and C̃ j,3 = gt̃ j . Moreover, it computes D̃=H5(B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,
(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ))s̃. Eventually, the intermediate ciphertext for the re-encryption key is IntC̃ =
((M,ρ), B̃1,C̃0,{C̃ j,1,C̃ j,2,C̃ j,3} j∈[1,l], D̃).
Second, it picks at random an exponent θ ∈ Zp and computes RK0,1 = KH3(δ )0 hθ , RK0,2 = gθ , RK1 =
KH3(δ )1 and for i = 1, · · · ,k, RKi,2 = K
H3(δ )
i,2 and RKi,3 = K
H3(δ )
i,3 .
The re-encryption key is RK = (S,RK0,1,RK0,2,RK1, {RKi,2, RKi,3}i∈[1,k], IntC̃).
OnEnc(PK,RK, IntC). The OnEnc algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK, the re-
encryption key RK for attribute set S and associated with the access structure (M,ρ), and an intermediate
ciphertext IntC.




∀ j ∈ [1,P],e(C j,1,g) ?= e(w,g)λ
′
j · e(v,C j,3)
∀ j ∈ [1,P],e(C j,2,g) ?= e(u,C−1j,3 )x j · e(h,C−1j,3 )
e(C0,1,H4(B1,C0,1,C0,2,(C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · ,(CP,1,CP,2,CP,3))) ?= e(g,D) (1)
and the validity of the re-encryption key RK as follows:
e(C̃0,H5(B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ))) ?= e(g, D̃).
It takes the element s from IntC and picks at random y2, · · · ,yn ∈Zp, sets the vector~y=(s,y2, · · · ,yn)T ,
where T denotes the transpose of the matrix, and computes a vector of shares of s as (λ1, · · · ,λl)T =M ·~y.
Let I ⊂ {1, · · · , l} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}, and {wi ∈ Zp}i∈I be a set of constants such that
∑i∈I wi ·λi = s. For j = 1, · · · , l, it then computes C j,4 = λ j−λ ′j and C j,5 = t j · (ρ( j)− x j). Intuitively,
this corrects to the proper attributes and shares of s. Finally, it computes the value B2 as the quotient:
B2 =
e(C0,1,RK0,1)/e(C0,2,RK0,2)
e(w∑i∈I Ci,4·wi ,RK1) ·∏i∈I(e(Ci,1,RK1) · e(Ci,2 ·uCi,5 ,RK j,2) · e(Ci,3,RK j,3))wi
,
where j is the index of the attribute ρ(i) in S (it depends on i).
It sets the ciphertext as CT = ((M,ρ),C0,1,B2, IntC̃).
Dec(PK,SK,CT ). The Dec algorithm recovers the message M . It takes as input the public pa-
rameters PK, the ciphertext CT = ((M,ρ),C0,1,B2, IntC̃) for access structure (M,ρ), and a private key
SK = (S,K0,K1,{Ki,2,Ki,3}i∈[1,k]) for attribute set S. If S does not satisfy this access structure (M,ρ),
then the algorithm issues ⊥. Otherwise, it sets I ⊂ {1, · · · , l} as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S} and finds the set of
constants {w̃i ∈ Zp}i∈I such that ∑i∈I w̃i · λ̃i = s̃ (let Mi be the i-th row pf the matrix M, we have that
∑i∈I w̃i ·Mi = (1,0, · · · ,0)). Then, it checks that:
S satisifies (M,ρ)?
e(C̃0,H5(B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ))) ?= e(g, D̃) (2)
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If the above equations hold, then it proceeds; otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
To recover the message M , the algorithm first recovers the value e(g,g)α s̃ by calculating:
e(C̃0,K0)
∏i∈I(e(C̃i,1,K1) · e(C̃i,2,K j,2) · e(C̃i,3,K j,3))w̃i
where j is the index of the attribute ρ(i) in S (it depends on i). Afterwards, it computes H1(e(g,g)α s̃)⊕
B̃1 = H1(e(g,g)α s̃)⊕ (δ‖β̃ )⊕H1(e(g,g)α s̃) = δ‖β̃ . If C̃0 = gH2(β̃ ,δ ), then it proceeds; otherwise, it out-
puts ⊥. Finally, it computes H1(B1/H3(δ )2 )⊕B1 = H1(e(g,g)α·s)⊕M ‖β ⊕H1(e(g,g)α·s) = M ‖β , and
outputs M if C0,1 = gH2(β ,M ); otherwise it outputs ⊥.
Correctness
We show the correctness of the above construction as follows. If the attribute set S of the ciphertext
is authorized, then ∑i∈I wi ·λi = s and ∑i∈I w̃i · λ̃i = s̃. We recall that ρ(i) = A j. Therefore, the value B2
is recovered as follows:
B2 =
e(C0,1,RK0,1)/e(C0,2,RK0,2)






e(w∑i∈I Ci,4·wi ,KH3(δ )1 ) ·∏i∈I(e(Ci,1,K
H3(δ )
1 ) · e(Ci,2 ·u−Ci,5 ,K
H3(δ )





(e(gs,gαwr)H3(δ ) · e(gs,hθ ))/e(hs,gθ )
e(w∑i∈I(λi−λ ′i )wi ,gr)H3(δ ) ·∏i∈I(e(wλ
′
i vti ,gr) · e((uxih)−ti ·u−ti(ρ(i)−xi),gr j) · e(gti ,(uA j h)r j v−r))H3(δ )·wi
=
e(g,g)αs·H3(δ ) · e(g,w)sr·H3(δ )
(e(g,w)∑i∈I(λi−λ ′i )r ·∏i∈I e(g,w)λ
′
i re(g,v)tire(g,u)−ρ(i)tir j e(g,h)−tir j e(g,u)A jtir j e(g,h)tir j e(g,v)−tir)H3(δ )·wi
=
e(g,g)αs·H3(δ ) · e(g,w)sr·H3(δ )




e(g,g)αs·H3(δ ) · e(g,w)sr·H3(δ )
e(g,w)r·H3(δ )∑i∈I λiwi
= e(g,g)αs·H3(δ )
and the value e(g,g)α s̃ is recovered as follows:
e(C̃0,K0)
∏i∈I(e(C̃i,1,K1) · e(C̃i,2,K j,2) · e(C̃i,3,K j,3))w̃i
=
e(gs̃,gαwr)
∏i∈I(e(wλ̃ivt̃i ,gr) · e((uρ(i)h)−t̃i ,gr j) · e(gt̃i ,(uA j h)r j v−r))w̃i
=
e(g,g)α s̃ · e(g,w)s̃r
(∏i∈I e(g,w)λ̃ire(g,v)t̃ire(g,u)−ρ(i)t̃ir j e(g,h)−t̃ir j e(g,u)A j t̃ir j e(g,h)t̃ir j e(g,v)−t̃ir)w̃i
=
e(g,g)α s̃ · e(g,w)s̃r
∏i∈I e(g,w)λ̃irw̃i
=
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5 Security Proof
5.1 Assumptions
We first recall the definitions of the Computational BDHE and Decisional q-parallel Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman Exponent assumption, and subsequently, we recall the assumption similar to the previous one,
called the q−1 assumption as defined in [28].
Given a security parameter λ ∈N, we assume that there is a group generator algorithm GroupGen(λ )→
(p,G,GT ,e) that outputs the description of the symmetric bilinear group of order p = Θ(2λ ).
Definition 7 (Computational BDHE Assumption). Given an integer q polynomial in λ , a generator g of
G and a tuple T =
g,gagb,gc
the computational BDHE problem is to output Z = e(g,g)abc, where a,b,c∈R Zp. We define SuccCBDHEA =
Pr[A (T,e(g,g)abc) = 0] as the success of an adversary A in solving the computational BDHE prob-
lem. We say that the computational BDHE assumption holds in (G,GT ) if no PPT algorithm has non-
negligible success.
Definition 8 (Decisional q-parallel BDHE Assumption). Given an integer q polynomial in λ , a generator
g of G and a tuple T =
g,gs,ga, · · · ,gaq ,gaq+2 , · · · ,ga2q
∀1≤ j ≤ q,gs·b j ,ga/b j , · · · ,gaq/b j ,gaq+2/b j , · · · ,ga2q/b j
∀1≤ j,k ≤ q, j 6= k,ga·s·bk/b j , · · · ,gaq·s·bk/b j
the decisional q-parallel BDHE problem is to decide whether Z = e(g,g)a
q+1·s, where a,s,b1, · · · ,bq ∈R
Zp, or Z = R ∈R GT . We define AdvD−q−PBDHEA = |Pr[A (T,e(g,g)a
q+1·s) = 0]−Pr[A (T,R) = 0]| as
the advantage of an adversary A in winning the decisional q-parallel BDHE problem. We say that
the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption holds in (G,GT ) if no PPT algorithm has non-negligible
advantage.
Definition 9 (q− 1 Assumption). Given an integer q polynomial in λ , a generator g of G and a tuple
T =
g,gs
∀1≤ i, j ≤ q,gai ,gb j ,gs·b j ,gai·b j ,gai/b2j
∀1≤ i≤ 2q,1≤ j ≤ q, i 6= q+1,gai/b j
∀1≤ i≤ 2q,1≤ j,k ≤ q, j 6= k,gaib j/b2k
∀1≤ i≤ 2q,1≤ j,k ≤ q, j 6= k,gs·aib j/bk ,gs·aib j/b2k
the q−1 problem is to decide whether Z = e(g,g)aq+1·s, where a,s,b1, · · · ,bq ∈R Zp, or Z = R∈R GT . We
define Advq−1A = |Pr[A (T,e(g,g)a
q+1·s) = 0]−Pr[A (T,R) = 0]| as the advantage of an adversary A in
winning the q−1 problem. We say that the q−1 assumption holds in (G,GT ) if no PPT algorithm has
non-negligible advantage.
The hardness of this assumption has been studied in [28].
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5.2 Outsider Attacks
Selective IND-CCA Security Proof
Theorem 1. Suppose the q− 1 assumption holds in (G,GT ) and H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5 are hash
functions, our OO-CP-AB-PRE scheme is selectively IND-CCA secure in the random oracle model.
Proof. Suppose there is an adversary A who can break the IND-CCA security of our scheme. We then
construct a reduction algorithm B to decide whether Z is either equal to e(g,g)a
q+1·s or to a random
element R in GT . The simulator B plays the IND-CCA game with A as follows.
B takes as input (p,G,GT ,e), a q−1 problem instance T and Z, where Z is either equal to e(g,g)a
q+1·s
or to a random element R in GT .
Initialization. The adversary gives the challenge access structure (M∗,ρ∗) to B, where M∗ has l
rows and n columns such that l ≤ P,q and n≤ q.





(it can be seen that α = α ′+aq+1, which cannot be computed by B). We
note that α is correctly distributed. B also picks at random v̂, û, ĥ ∈R Zp and gives the following public
parameters to A :
















Since a is information-theoretically hidden from A , the value w is properly uniformly random in G.
The values v,u,h are properly distributed due to v̂, û, ĥ respectively. We note that all these values are
calculated by B using terms from the assumption instance and (M∗,ρ∗) given by A .
Then the simulator chooses the hash functions as in the real scheme, and sends the public parameters
PK = (p,G,GT ,e,g,h, ,u,v,w,e(g,g)α ,H1,H2,H3,H4,H5) to A . We note that the public parameters are
identical to those in the real scheme for the adversary. At any time, A can adaptively query the random
oracles H j for j ∈ [1,5], which are controlled by B. The simulator maintains the lists HListj for j ∈ [1,5],
which are initially empty, and answers the queries to the random oracles as follows.
• H1: on receipt of an H1 query on R ∈ GT , if there is a tuple (R,δ1) ∈ HList1 , B forwards the
predefined value δ1 to A , where δ1 ∈ {0,1}2λ . Otherwise, B sets H1(R) = δ1, responds δ1 to A
and adds the tuple (R,δ1) to HList1 , where δ1 ∈R {0,1}2λ .
• H2: on receipt of an H2 query on (β ,M ), if there is a tuple (β ,M ,s) ∈ HList2 , B forwards the
predefined value s to A , where s ∈ Zp. Otherwise, B sets H2(β ,M ) = s, responds s to A and
adds the tuple (β ,M ,s) to HList2 , where s ∈R Zp.
• H3: on receipt of an H3 query on δ ∈ {0,1}λ , if there is a tuple (δ ,ξ1) in HList3 , B forwards the
predefined value ξ1 to A , where ξ1 ∈ Zp. Otherwise, B sets H3(δ ) = ξ1 to A and adds the tuple
(δ ,ξ1) to HList3 , where ξ1 ∈R Zp.
• H4: on receipt of an H4 query on (B1,C0,1,C0,2,(C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · ,(Cl,1,Cl,2,Cl,3)), if there is
a tuple (B1,C0,1, C0,2,(C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · ,(Cl,1,Cl,2,Cl,3),ξ2,δ2) ∈ HList4 , B forwards the prede-
fined value δ2 to A , where ξ2 ∈ Zp,δ2 ∈ G. Otherwise, B sets δ2 = gξ2 , responds δ2 to A and
adds the tuple (B1,C0,1,C0,2, (C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · , (Cl,1,Cl,2,Cl,3),ξ2,δ2) in HList4 , where ξ2 ∈R Zp.
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• H5: on receipt of an H5 query on (B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ)), if there is
a tuple (B̃1, C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ),ξ3,δ3) ∈ HList5 , B forwards the prede-
fined value δ2 to A , where ξ3 ∈Zp,δ3 ∈G. Otherwise, B sets δ3 = gξ3 , responds δ3 to A and adds
the tuple (B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · , (C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ),ξ3,δ3) in HList5 , where ξ3 ∈R Zp.
In addition, B maintains the lists SKList , RKList and ONEList which are initially empty as follows:
• SKList records the tuples (S,SK) which are the results of the queries to Osk(S).
• RKList records the tuples (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,RK, tag1, tag2, tag3) which are the results of the queries
to Ork(S,(M,ρ)), where tag1, tag2 and tag3 denote that the re-encryption key is randomly chosen,
generated in Oone or in Ork, respectively.
• ONEList records the tuples (S,(M,ρ),CT, tag1, tag2, tag3) which are the results of the queries to
Oone(S,(M,ρ), IntC), where tag1, tag2 and tag3 denote that the ciphertext is generated under
a valid re-encryption key, under a randomly chosen re-encryption key or generated without any
re-encryption key, respectively.
Phase 1. The simulator answers to A ’s queries as follows.
• Private key extraction oracle Osk(S):
B has to produce private keys for non-authorized sets of attributes requested by A . B proceeds
in creating a key for an attribute set S = {A1, · · · ,A|S|} as follows.
Since S does not satisfy (M∗,ρ∗), there exists a vector ~w = (w1, · · · ,wn)T ∈ Znp such that w1 =−1
and M∗i ·~w = 0 for all i ∈ I = {i : ρ∗(i) ∈ S} ⊆ {1, · · · , l} (if S satisfies (M∗,ρ∗) then the simulator
outputs a random bit in {0,1} and aborts the simulation). B then picks at random r̂ ∈R Zp and
implicitly computes
r = r̂+w1aq + · · ·+wnaq+1−n = r̂+ ∑
i=1,··· ,n
wiaq+1−i.
This is properly distributed due to r̂. Then B computes




















Moreover, for all j = 1, · · · , |S|, B calculates the values K j,2 = gr j and K j,3 =(uA j h)r j v−r as follows




kM∗j′,k/b j′ )−∑i=1,··· ,n wia
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−wiM∗j′,k . The value Q can be cal-
culated by B using the assumption and ∏ j′=1,··· ,l,ρ( j)/∈S g
−~w·M∗j′a
q+1/b j′ should be wiped out by
(uA j h)r j . Therefore, for all attribute A j ∈ S, B implicitly computes













such that r̂ j is randomly chosen in Zp and thus, r j is properly distributed. The values bi at the
numerator cancel out with the values b2i at the denominator, and thus cancel out the unknown part
of v−r.
Moreover, we note that r j is well defined only for the attributes in the unauthorized set S or the
unrelated attributes (not in the policy), since the sum is over the i′’s such that ρ∗(i′) /∈ S. Thus, for
all A j ∈ S or all A j /∈ {ρ∗(1), · · · ,ρ∗(l)}, the denominators A j−ρ∗(i′) are non-zero. If B tries to
put more attributes in the policy, and possibly create a key for an unauthorized set, then it would
have to divide by zero. Then, we obtain K j,3 = (uA j h)r j v−r such that

















w j′ bi′ a
q+1− j′
A j−ρ∗(i′)





















































Empowering Personal Health Records with Cloud Computing Gritti, Susilo, Plantard, Liang, and Wong
The values Q′ and K j,2 can be calculated using the values from the problem instance. The second
part of (uA j h)r j cancels out with the unknown part of v−r. Thus, B can compute K j,2 and K j,3 for
all the attributes A j in S and returns the private key SK = (S,K0,K1,{K j,2,K j,3} j∈[1,|S|]) to A .
• Re-encryption key extraction oracle Ork(S,(M,ρ)):
If (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,RK,∗,0,1) ∈ RKList , then the simulator returns RK to the adversary. Otherwise,
B proceeds as follows.
– If S satisfies (M∗,ρ∗) and (S,SK) ∈ SKList , then B returns a random bit in {0,1} and aborts
the simulation.
– If S satisfies (M∗,ρ∗) and (S,SK) /∈ SKList , then B verifies whether (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,RK,1,1,0)∈
RKList . If yes, B returns SK to the adversary and resets tag2 = 0, tag3 = 1. Otherwise, the
simulator selects at random θ ,σ ,σ1, · · · ,σ|S| ∈R Zp, β̃ ,δ ∈R {0,1}λ , K̄0, K̄1, · · · , K̄|S| ∈R G.
It then sets RK0,1 = K̄0 · hθ , RK0,2 = gθ , RK1 = gσ and for i = 1, · · · , |S|, RKi,2 = gσi and
RKi,3 = K̄
σi
i · v−σ , and constructs IntC̃ using β̃ and δ as in the real scheme. Eventually, B
outputs RK to A , and adds (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,RK,1,0,1) to RKList .
– Otherwise, if (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,RK,0,1,0) ∈ RKList , B gives RK to A , and resets tag2 =
0, tag3 = 1. Otherwise, B first constructs the private key SK for the attribute set S as for
the private key extraction queries. The simulator then generates RK as in the real scheme,
gives it to the adversary, and adds (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,RK,0,0,1) to RKList .
• Online encryption oracle Oone(S,(M,ρ), IntC):
The simulator checks wether Eq. 1 holds. If not, meaning that either the intermediate ciphertext
IntC is invalid or S does not satisfy (M,ρ), it returns ⊥. Otherwise, B works as follows.
– If S satisfies (M∗,ρ∗) and (S,SK) /∈ SKList , then the simulator first construct the re-encryption
key as the second case for the re-encryption key extraction queries, re-encrypts IntC and gives
it to the adversary. It then adds (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,RK,1,1,0) to RKList and (S,(M,ρ),CT,0,1,0)
to ONEList .
– Otherwise, the simulator first constructs RK as the third case for the re-encryption key extrac-
tion queries, re-encrypts IntC and gives it to the adversary. It then adds (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,RK,0,1,0)
to RKList and (S,(M,ρ),CT,1,0,0) to ONEList .





If no such tuple exists, then the simulator returns⊥. Otherwise, it verifies whether (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,⊥
,⊥,1, ⊥) ∈ RKList such that S satisfies (M∗,ρ∗). If no, the simulator selects at random
β̃ ,δ ∈ {0,1}λ , generates IntC̃ as in the real scheme, in order to hide δ and β̃ . It then
constructs B2 = (e(ga,ga
q
) · e(g,gα ′))s·ξ1 where ξ1 = H3(δ ). Eventually, B outputs CT =
((M,ρ),C0,1, ,B2,C̃0, IntC̃), gives it to the adversary, and adds (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,⊥,⊥,1,⊥) to
RKList and (S,(M,ρ),CT,0,0,1) to ONEList .
• Ciphertext decryption oracle Od(S,CT ):
B first checks if there are tuples (β̃ ,δ , s̃) and (β ,M ,s) in HList2 such that C̃0 = g
s̃ and C0,2 = hs. If
not, the simulator outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it checks whether Eq. 2 holds. It not, meaning that either
IntC̃ is invalid or S does not satisfy (M,ρ), it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, B proceeds as follows:
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– If (S,(M,ρ),δ , β̃ ,RK,1,0,1) ∈ RKList or (S,(M,ρ),CT,0,1,0) ∈ ONEList , it verifies
∀ j ∈ [1, l],e(C̃ j,1,g) ?= e(w,g)λ̃
′
j · e(v,C̃ j,3)
∀ j ∈ [1, l],e(C̃ j,2,g) ?= e(u,C̃−1j,3 )x̃ j · e(h,C̃−1j,3 ) (3)
where given I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S} and M, it can find the vector ~̃w = {w̃i ∈ Zp}i∈I such that
∑i∈I w̃i · λ̃i = s̃. If the above equation does not hold, then the simulator returns ⊥. Otherwise,
it computes C0,1 = gs with the knowledge of s and then checks Eq. 1. If the equation does
not hold, then it returns ⊥. Otherwise, B recovers the random re-encryption key RK =





e(w∑i∈I Ci,4 ·wi ,RK1)·∏i∈I(e(Ci,1,RK1)·e(Ci,2·uCi,5 ,RK j,2)·e(Ci,3,RK j,3))wi
where I and wi are defined in
the ReEnc phase. If the previous equation does not hold, then it returns ⊥. Otherwise, the
simulator verifies whether (R,δ1) ∈ HList1 such that B1 = (β‖M )⊕δ1 and R = e(g,g)α·s. If
no such tuple exists, B returns ⊥. Otherwise, it outputs M and gives it to A .
– Otherwise, if (S,SK) ∈ SKList , the simulator recovers M as in the real scheme using SK.
Otherwise, B verifies whether Eq. 2 and Eq. 3 hold. If not, it returns⊥. Otherwise, it verifies
whether (R,δ1)∈HList1 such that B1 = (β‖M )⊕δ1 and R = e(g,g)α·s, and B2 = e(g,g)α·s·ξ1 .
If no such tuple exists and the equations do not hold, B returns ⊥. Otherwise, it outputs M
and gives it to A .
Challenge. The challenge ciphertext is constructed as follows. The adversary gives two equal-length
messages M0 and M1 to the simulator. The simulator flips a coin b and answers to A as follows. IntC is
generated as in the real scheme, meaning that IntC = (s,B1,C0,1,C0,2,{λ ′j, t j,x j,C j,1,C2, j,C3, j} j∈[1,l],D)
We suppose that the value C0,2 is not necessarily output.
Then, B chooses at random β̃ ∗,δ ∗ ∈R {0,1}λ , issues an H3 query on δ ∗ to obtain ξ ∗1 . We notice that
in the previous step, (β ,Mb) must be issued to H2 such that the tuple (β ,Mb,s) is already stored in HList2 ,







1 . Moreover, B chooses at random B̃∗1 ∈R {0,1}2λ and implicitly sets H1(Z · e(gs̃,gα
′
)) =
B̃∗1⊕ (δ ∗‖β̃ ∗) and C̃∗0 = gs̃.
B can choose the secret splitting in order to cancel out the terms. For that, it chooses at random
ˆ̃y2, · · · , ˆ̃yn and shares the secret using the vector ~̃y = (s̃, s̃a+ ˆ̃y2, · · · , s̃an−1 + ˆ̃yn) ∈ Znp. We note that the
secret s̃ and the vector ~̃y are properly distributed since s̃ is information-theoretically hidden from A
and the ˆ̃y j’s are uniformly randomly chosen. Since
~̃
λ = M∗ ·~̃y, we have that λ̃ j = ∑i=1,··· ,n M∗j,is̃ai−1 +
∑i=2,··· ,n M∗j,i ˆ̃yi =∑i=1,··· ,n M
∗
j,is̃a
i−1+ ˆ̃λ j for each row j = 1, · · · , l. We note that the values ˆ̃λ j =∑i=2,··· ,n M∗j,i ˆ̃yi
are known to B.
For each row, B implicitly sets t̃ j =−s̃b j, which is properly distributed since the b j’s are information-
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theoretically hidden from A . Then, B computes the following:
C̃∗j,1 = w


























k s̃b j/b j · ∏








λ j · (gs̃b j)v̂ · ∏






ρ∗( j)h)t̃ j = (gs̃b j)−(ûρ







∗( j)+ĥ) · ∏






t̃ j = (gs̃b j)−1
Since t̃ j = −s̃b j, we “raised” the exponents of the value so that they cancel out with the exponents of

















1,3), · · · ,(C̃∗l,1,C̃∗l,2,C̃∗l,3),(M∗,ρ∗),ξ ∗3 ,δ ∗3 ), and sets D̃∗= (gs̃)ξ
∗




Finally, B returns the ciphertext CT ∗ = ((M∗,ρ∗),C0,1,B∗2, IntC̃) to A .
If Z = e(g,g)a
q+1·s, then CT ∗ is a valid ciphertext. Indeed, the components corresponding to IntC are
valid. Since IntC is encrypted to CT ∗ under a valid re-encryption key RK, the online encryption must
be valid, meaning that the construction of B∗2 is valid. Moreover, it is easy to see that the rest of the
components are valid too. Nevertheless, if Z = R ∈ GT , then the challenge ciphertext is independent of
the bit b for A .
Phase 2. Same as in Phase 1 but with the constraints defined in the Selective IND-CCA security at
ciphertext Model.
Guess. A outputs a bit b′ ∈R {0,1} for b. If b′ = b, then B outputs 0, meaning that it claims that the
challenge Z is equal to e(g,g)a
q+1·s; otherwise, it outputs 1.
If Z = e(g,g)a
q+1·s, then A played the proper security game, since B1 = (Mb‖β )⊕H1(e(g,gs)α
′ ·
Z) = (Mb‖β )⊕H1(e(g,g)α·s). If Z is a random term R of GT , then all information about the message
Mb is lost in the challenge ciphertext. Thus, the advantage of A is exactly 0. Therefore, if A breaks
the proper security game with a non-negligible advantage, then B has a non-negligible advantage in
breaking the q−1 assumption.
Analysis of the simulations of the Random Oracles
The simulations of the random oracles are perfect except H1, H2 and H3. Let H∗1 and H
∗
2 be the events
that A has queried before the Challenge phase: R∗ = e(g,g)αs to H1 (the probability of successful query
is qH1/2
2λ ) and (β ∗,Mb) to H2 (the probability of successful query is qH2/p). Let H
∗
3 denotes the
event that A queried δ ∗ to H3 before the Challenge phase: this happens with probability qH3/p. In the
simulation of Osk, the responses to A are perfect.
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In the simulation of Od , it might be possible that the simulator cannot provide a decryption for a
valid ciphertext. Suppose the adversary can generate a valid ciphertext without querying e(g,g)αs to
H1, where s = H2(β ,M ). Let ValCT be the event that the ciphertext is valid, QueryH1 be the event
that the adversary has queried e(g,g)αs to H1, and QueryH2 be the event that the adversary has queried
(β ,M ) to H2. From the simulation, Pr[ValCT | ¬QueryH1] ≤ Pr[QueryH2 | QueryH1] +Pr[ValCT |
QueryH1 ∧¬QueryH2] ≤ qH2/22λ + 1/p and Pr[ValCT | ¬QueryH2] ≤ qH1/22λ + 1/p, where qH1 ,qH2
are the maximum numbers of random oracle queries to H1,H2. Let Pr[ErrDec] be the probability that
the event ValCT | (¬QueryH1∨¬QueryH2) occurs, then Pr[ErrDec]≤ (qH1+qH222λ +
2
p)qd , where qd is the
total number of decryption queries.
Let Bad denote the event that (H∗2 | ¬H∗1 )∨H∗1 ∨H∗3 ∨ErrDec, then






















Selective Collusion Resistance Proof
Theorem 2. Suppose the CBDHE assumption holds in (G,GT ) and H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5 are hash
functions, our OO-CP-AB-PRE scheme is selectively collusion resistant in the random oracle model.
Proof. Suppose there is an adversary A who can break the collusion resistance of our scheme. We then
construct a reduction algorithm B to output Z equal to e(g,g)abc. The simulator B plays the collusion
resistance game with A as follows.
B takes as input (p,G,GT ,e) and a CBDHE problem instance T = (g,ga,gb,gc); its goal is to output
Z = e(g,g)abc.
Initialization. The adversary gives the challenge set S∗ to B.
Setup. The simulator sets w= gb,e(g,g)α = e(ga,gb) = e(g,g)ab. It also chooses at random u,h,v∈R
G and gives these public parameters to A .
We note that the public parameters are identical to those in the real scheme for the adversary. At
any time, A can adaptively query the random oracles H j for j ∈ [1,5], which are controlled by B. The
simulator maintains the lists HListj for j ∈ [1,4], which are initially empty, and answers the queries to the
random oracles as follows.
• H1: on receipt of an H1 query on R ∈ GT , if there is a tuple (R,δ1) ∈ HList1 , B forwards the
predefined value δ1 to A , where δ1 ∈ {0,1}2λ . Otherwise, B sets H1(R) = δ1, responds δ1 to A
and adds the tuple (R,δ1) to HList1 , where δ1 ∈R {0,1}2λ .
• H2: on receipt of an H2 query on (β ,M ), if there is a tuple (β ,M ,s) ∈ HList2 , B forwards the
predefined value s to A , where s ∈ Zp. Otherwise, B sets H2(β ,M ) = s, responds s to A and
adds the tuple (β ,M ,s) to HList2 , where s ∈R Zp.
• H3: on receipt of an H3 query on δ ∈ {0,1}λ , if there is a tuple (δ ,ξ1) in HList3 , B forwards the
predefined value ξ1 to A , where ξ1 ∈ Zp. Otherwise, B sets H3(δ ) = ξ1 to A and adds the tuple
(δ ,ξ1) to HList3 , where ξ1 ∈R Zp.
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• H4: on receipt of an H4 query on (B1,C0,1,C0,2,(C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · ,(Cl,1,Cl,2,Cl,3)), if there is
a tuple (B1,C0,1, C0,2,(C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · ,(Cl,1,Cl,2,Cl,3),ξ2,δ2) ∈ HList4 , B forwards the prede-
fined value δ2 to A , where ξ2 ∈ Zp,δ2 ∈ G. Otherwise, B sets δ2 = gξ2 , responds δ2 to A and
adds the tuple (B1,C0,1,C0,2, (C1,1,C1,2,C1,3), · · · , (Cl,1,Cl,2,Cl,3),ξ2,δ2) in HList4 , where ξ2 ∈R Zp.
• H5: on receipt of an H5 query on (B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ)), if there is
a tuple (B̃1, C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ),ξ3,δ3) ∈ HList5 , B forwards the prede-
fined value δ2 to A , where ξ3 ∈Zp,δ3 ∈G. Otherwise, B sets δ3 = gξ3 , responds δ3 to A and adds
the tuple (B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · , (C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ),ξ3,δ3) in HList5 , where ξ3 ∈R Zp.
Query Phase. The simulator answers to A ’s queries as follows.
• Private key extraction oracle Osk(S):
Let S = {A1, · · · ,Ak} be an attribute set such that S 6= S∗. Thus, there exists an index j such that
A j ∈ S∧ A j /∈ S∗ or A j /∈ S∧ A j ∈ S∗. Without lost of generality, we focus on the analysis of
A j ∈ S∧A j /∈ S∗. For i = 1, · · · ,k. B randomly chooses r′i ∈R Zp and implicitly sets the elements
r and ri as follows:
ri = r′i for i 6= j
























i for i = 1, · · · ,k, i 6= j
K j,2 = g−a+r
′







B returns the private key SK = (S,K0,K1,{Ki,2,Ki,3}i∈[1,k]) to A .
• Re-encryption key extraction oracle Ork(S):
Let S be an attribute set. If S 6= S∗, then A proceeds as follows: the private key SK is obtained
from KeyGen(PK,MSK,S) and RK from ReKeyGen(PK,SK). Otherwise, it proceeds as follows.
First, B computes IntC̃: it picks at random β̃ ,δ ∈ {0,1}λ and issues a H2 query on (β̃ ,δ ) to
obtain s̃ and a H1 query on e(g,g)α·s̃ = e(g,g)ab·s̃ to obtain δ1. It then computes B̃1 = (δ‖β̃ )⊕δ1
and C̃0 = gs̃. It also picks at random ỹ2, · · · , ỹn ∈ Zp, sets the vector ~̃y = (s̃, ỹ2, · · · , ỹn)T , and
computes a vector of shares of s̃ as (λ̃1, · · · , λ̃l)T = M ·~̃y, where M is a l× n matrix and l ≤ P.
Then, for j = 1, · · · , l, it chooses at random t̃ j ∈ Zp and computes C̃ j,1 = wλ̃ j vt̃ j , C̃ j,2 = (uρ( j)h)−t̃ j
and C̃ j,3 = gt̃ j .
Moreover, it issues a H5 query on (B̃1,C̃0,(C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ)) to obtain
(B̃1, C̃0, (C̃1,1,C̃1,2,C̃1,3), · · · ,(C̃l,1,C̃l,2,C̃l,3),(M,ρ),ξ3,δ3), and sets D̃ = (gs̃)ξ3 . Eventually, the
intermediate ciphertext for the re-encryption key is IntC̃ =((M,ρ), B̃1,C̃0,{C̃ j,1,C̃2, j,C̃3, j} j∈[1,l], D̃).






iξ1 , RK0,2 = gθ , and RK1 = K
ξ1
1 = g
−a+∑ki=1 r′iξ1 . It also chooses an index j in [1,k] and
computes RKi,2 and RKi,3 as follows:
21













i)ξ1 for i = 1, · · · ,k, i 6= j
RK j,2 = K
ξ1
j,2 = g










B returns the re-encryption key RK = (S∗,RK0,1,RK0,2,RK1,{RKi,2,RKi,3}i∈[1,k], IntC̃) to A .
Output. The challenge private key SK∗ = (S∗,K∗0 ,K∗1 ,{K∗i,2,K∗i,3}i∈[1,k∗]) for S∗ = {A∗1, · · · ,A∗k∗} is






i h,K∗i,2) · e(g,K∗i,3)







i h,K∗i,2) · e(gc,K∗i,3)
= e(g,g)abc
and solves the CBDH problem.
Analysis of the simulations of the Random Oracles
In the simulation of Osk, the responses to A are perfect. The simulations of the random oracles are
perfect except H3. Let H∗3 be the event that A has queried before the Output phase δ to H3: this event





6 Computation Cost Analysis
We discuss about the computation costs in our scheme and compare them to other schemes. We
provide the results in Table 1.
The algorithm Setup is similar in the four proposed systems and has constant size. In all the proto-
cols, the algorithm KeyGen executes O(c) exponentiations in G, where c is the maximum max(k, l, l′, |I|).
During the run of the algorithms OffEnc and Enc in the different schemes, the number of exponentia-
tions in G is linear in the number of rows of the matrix representing the access structure: in OffEnc, the
number of exponentiations in G is O(P), where P is the maximum bound of rows in any LSSS access
structure and in Enc, the number of exponentiations in G is O(c). An extra computation cost for the
(offline) encryption is the cost of computing one exponentiation in GT .
Comparing our work and [28, 15], the number of exponentiations in GT required for the algorithm
Dec is linear in the number c; whereas in [20], the number of exponentiations in GT is constant. In all
the systems, the numbers of pairings performed for the decryption is linear in the number c. In [15],
an extra computation cost for the decryption is about the cost of computing O(c) exponentiations in
G. Comparing our work with [20], an extra computation cost for the decryption is about the cost of
computing O(1) exponentiations in G.
Our scheme differs in the execution of the algorithms ReKeyGen and OnEnc. We notice that there
is no computation cost for the online encryption in [15]. The algorithm ReKeyGen of our protocol
reveals the LSSS access structure and forces to compute elements according to it; whereas in [20], an
access structure is already defined in Enc, enabling to mitigate the computation cost in ReKeyGen.
In the algorithm OnEnc of our protocol, the Eq. 1 requires the computation of O(P) inversions in G,
exponentiations in GT and pairings to ensure the integrity of the elements computed previously. An
extra computation cost for the online encryption of our system is due to the cost of computing O(c)
exponentiations in G and in GT and pairings. This cost is similar to the one in ReEnc in [20].
22
Empowering Personal Health Records with Cloud Computing Gritti, Susilo, Plantard, Liang, and Wong
Scheme Algorithm Exp. in G Exp. in GT Pairings
Setup 1 1
[28] KeyGen 3+4c




OO-CP-ABE OffEnc 1+5P 1
OnEnc
Dec 1+ c c 2+3c
Setup 1 1 1
KeyGen 3+ c
[20] Enc 3+3c 1
CP-AB-PRE ReKeyGen 2+3c 1
ReEnc 1+2c c 9+4c
Dec1 1 1 8+4c
Dec2 4 1 3+2c
Setup 1 1
KeyGen 3+4c
Our OffEnc 3+5P 1
OO-CP-AB-PRE ReKeyGen 6+7c 1
OnEnc 1+ c+2P c+2P 9+3c+6P
Dec 2 1+ c 3+3c
Table 1: Group operation benchmarks. Exp. designates the number of exponentiations in the groups.
We include the number of inversions in G in the number of exponentiations in G. A blank means that
there is no group operation performed. Let Setup be the setup algorithm, KeyGen be the key generation
algorithm, Enc be the encryption algorithm, OffEnc be the offline encryption algorithm, ReKeyGen be
the re-key generation algorithm, OnEnc be the online encryption algorithm, ReEnc be the re-encryption
algorithm, Dec be the decryption algorithm, Dec1 be the decryption algorithm using the secret key, and
Dec2 be the decryption algorithm using the re-encryption key. Let k denote the number of attributes in
the set S = {A1, · · · ,Ak}, P denote the maximum bound of rows in any LSSS access structure used in a
ciphertext, l and l′ denote the number of rows in the access structures (M,ρ) and (M′,ρ ′) respectively,
and |I| denote the cardinality of the set I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S} ⊂ {1, · · · , l}. For clarity in the table, let c be the
maximum max(k, l, l′, |I|) and we suppose that P may be much more greater than c.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the first single-hop unidirectional Online/Offline Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-
Based Proxy Re-Encryption (OO-CP-AB-PRE) system, proven selectively CCA secure in the random
oracle model and selectively collusion resistant in the random oracle model. The scheme supports
Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption with any monotonic access structures and deals with Online/Of-
fline encryption.
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